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 1 Introduction 
Lifecycles have been accepted widely as a matter of fact in business. Existing 
literature focuses on their theoretical implications for product managers and cor-
porate strategists. There are major shortcomings of the research in that field 
concerning the populations covered (if at all, mostly hardware) and the theo-
reticcal as well as empirical analysis of the drivers of the lifecycles in the various 
industries. 
Based on the research of Menhart et al. (2003), we chose a population of 
service organizations to analyze the drivers of the lifecycle. We will develop a 
concept for an insurance specific industry life cycle with a non-typical matu-
ration and degeneration phase, and discuss to what extent the concept of Mas-
low's pyramid of needs can have explanatory power regarding the pattern of 
density dynamics.  
 
2 Historical development of the German insurance market 
The global insurance industry experienced a significant growth in the 20th 
century. The number of insurance companies increased from about 1.300 in the 
year 1900 to more than 14.000 at the end of the last century. The German 
insurance market of the year 1999 comprises approximately 2.000 companies.1  
It was not before the founding of the first joint-stock insurance companies in 
Germany at the beginning of the 19th century that the insurance industry started 
to grow into a significant economic sector. The idea of insurance gained further 
acceptance within the society when the era of liberalism led to the founding of 
several private insurance companies.2 the "final breakthrough" for the German 
insurance industry came with the first social legislation in the year 1881. The 
introduction of a public medical insurance in 1883, a public accident insurance 
in 1884 and a sort of public pension insurance in 1889 did not imply a substitu-
tion of private by public insurance institutions, but helped to further spread the 
idea of insurance within the society, a development of which the private insu-
rance industry profited significantly.3 The industrialization and the development 
                                                 
1  Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen (2000, p. 8). 
2  Schieren (1990, p. 21). 
3  Borscheid (1990, p. 12). 
 of new technologies also led to new needs of insurance, such as the classes of 
machine/technology or car insurance. At the same time, the government forced 
the employers to protect their employees against accidents at work, leading to 
the introduction of the accident insurance. As the potential claims in case of ac-
cidents caused by new technologies reached sums not experienced before by 
the owners of machinery such as railways etc., the personal liability insurance 
became increasingly important.  
The First World War caused a first major crisis of the German insurance 
industry. The total international business of the reinsurance and the transport 
insurance collapsed. The life and accident insurance companies first invested 
major parts of their capital into the so-called "Kriegsanleihen", war bonds issued 
by the government. Moreover, they had to pay enormous sums due to war ca-
sualties, which had been excluded from the insurance contracts before the war, 
but finally were reintroduced due to public pressure.4  
Those companies surviving the war were hit by the next fundamental exoge-
nous shock, the period of inflation in the twenties. At the beginning of this deca-
de, the insurance market experienced a boom caused by the enormous surplus 
money created during the inflation. Many new insurance companies arose and 
even firms from the manufacturing industry decided to found own banks and 
insurance companies. However, only few of them were able to overcome the 
final devaluation of the money. Thus, this period experienced the most dramatic 
consolidation in the history of the German insurance industry.  
The third fundamental exogenous shock in the first half of the 20th century was, 
of course, the regime of the National Socialists respectively the Second World 
War. In the thirties, the government tried to centralize the insurance market and 
forced lots of small companies to merge. The Second World War deleted not 
only the capital reserves of the insurance companies, but also their administra-
tions. The medical and life insurance companies again had to pay enormous 
sums and the car insurance industry completely collapsed due to the destruc-
tion of the public infrastructure. The total insurance market of the Eastern re-
gions was withdrawn after 1945, so that lots of insurance companies moved to 
the west. 
                                                 
4  Wandel (1998, p. 63f.). 
 However, just as the whole German economy, the insurance industry soon re-
covered from this catastrophe and experienced a period of steady and conti-
nuous growth after 1950. While the development of this sector was significantly 
influenced by fundamental exogenous shocks in the first half of the 20th century, 
in the last 50 years only two events need to be mentioned in this respect, the 
German reunification in 1990 and the deregulation of the European insurance 
market in 1994. The effects of both of these exogenous changes are not com-
parable to the effects of the crises before the Second World War. The German 
reunification more or less only led to a single increase in the insurance volume 
of Germany, which was almost totally captured by the major existing players in 
the market. The European deregulation was first believed to motivate inter-
national companies to enter the German insurance market. However, the major 
effect in the reality was the beginning of a price war between the existing com-
panies, as the insurance offerings no longer had to be approved by the public 
authorities.   
Moreover, the 20th century, in general, and the last 50 years, in particular, did 
not experience the same amount of fundamental product innovations as the 19th 
century. The major trends of this last epoch of the insurance industry were the 
diversification of the product portfolios of existing companies as well as the 
introduction of product modifications such as the combination of several classes 
of insurance in one contract, or the adjustment of the insurance premiums to the 
individual needs of the customers. 
 
3 Product innovations in the insurance industry 
Before we can lay the theoretical base for the analysis of the historical deve-
lopment of the German insurance market and the role of product innovations in 
the evolution of this industry, we first want to define, what is the product created 
by an insurance company, and discuss the different forms of innovation in this 
sector.5 In the existing literature, there is more or less general agreement that 
the insurance industry belongs to the service sector.6 However, there is not so 
much consent on how the product of an insurance company can be defined.7 
                                                 
5  See also Menhart et al. (2003). 
6  Farny (1971), Haller (1982) or Vielreicher (1995). 
7  Farny (1979), Müller (1981). 
 Albrecht (1992, p.4) sees the insurance product as a transfer of information and 
conditional payments from the insurance company to the customer and, at the 
same time, a transfer of risks and a monetary premium vice versa, as shown in 
the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Insurance as transfer of risk and information8 
The insurance company sells specific information regarding the insured object 
to the customer. The information consists of the guarantee to pay a monetary 
equivalent for the object insured in case a defined event (accident, fire, etc.) 
occurs. The customer pays a certain premium and transfers the risk of having a 
monetary disadvantage due to potential damage to the insurance company. 
In order to define the different forms of innovation in the insurance industry, we 
differentiate between the subject and the object dimension of the product inno-
vation.9 In the subject dimension, the degree of newness is regarded from the 
perspective of the customer. If the product is new to the market, it is called 
market novelty. In case an insurance company introduces a product that has 
 
                                                 
8  See Albrecht (1992).  
9  Widmer (1986). 
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 not been in its product portfolio before, but already existed on the market we 
call it internal novelty.10 
Service goods are immaterial.11 The customers cannot test the quality of the 
good to be purchased in advance. Thus, a certain degree of confidence is re-
quired in the product to be bought from the service company. This is especially 
true for insurance products. The product sold by the insurance company is the 
guarantee to pay a monetary equivalent for the object insured in case a defined 
event (accident, fire, etc.) occurs. This guarantee is not only immaterial, but the 
customer can only experience the quality of the product if the insured event 
actually happens. Therefore, the product has also a very abstract nature. Above 
all, in case of product innovations, the reputation and the image of the insu-
rance company are essential factors for the success of the product. This is why 
customers often tend to buy insurance bundles from one company rather than 
several insurance contracts from different suppliers.12 
                                                 
10  In the object dimension of an innovation, the degree of newness of an insurance product is 
measured from the perspective of the company offering it. We will follow the methodology 
of Vielreicher (1995) to differentiate between product innovations and product modifyca-
tions. In his model, an insurance product can only be called innovative, if it creates a new 
"field of insurance". A field of insurance consists of certain risk factors (e.g. negligence or 
fire-raising), insured objects (e.g. houses or cars) and forms of incidents (fire or accidents). 
A innovative field of insurance is created, when one of those elements is changed comple-
tely or if parts of those elements are extracted and offered as an independent product. All 
other changes in the composition of the field of insurance are considered to be product mo-
difications. As the insurance industry is part of the service sector, one of the specific 
characteristics of the output produced is the difficulty to differentiate between the product 
and the process component of the good: "The first analytical problem raised by services is 
the relatively fuzzy and unstable nature of their product. Indeed a service is a process, a 
sequence of operations, a formula, a protocol, a mode of organization. It is difficult, in many 
cases, to locate the boundaries of a service in the same way as those of a good can be 
fixed." (Gallouij, 2002, p. xv). Services such as those offered by insurance companies are 
products as well as processes, as they are produced and consumed at the same time. 
Service companies cannot produce their output in advance and store it in order to sell it in 
the future. Similarly, customers of service companies cannot buy the goods and store it for 
later consumption. Therefore, the process of production is an essential part of the product 
itself. That is why the customers need to participate in the production process. Each service 
product hat a unique nature. It is produced according to the individual needs and problems 
of the customer. Customer interaction also plays a crucial role in the sales of service 
products. Muth (1988, p. 1586) claims that 80% of people buying a financial product such 
as an insurance contract insist on having a personal consultation with a representative of 
the respective company in advance. 
11  Hipp (2000, p. 19f.) Gallouij (2002, p. xv). 
12  Especially if the insurances purchased concern the basis of one's livelihood (e.g. life insu-
rance, fire insurance etc.), people often stick to the supplier they have trusted before in 
other classes of insurance. 
 As service goods such as insurance products are immaterial, it is generally 
easy for competitors to imitate product innovations.13 However, while competi-
tors can copy specific product characteristics quickly, it is far more difficult to 
reach the same level of reputation and customer acceptance first movers in the 
insurance market have.14 
Another typical market characteristic of the insurance industry the companies 
have to keep in mind in the generation of product innovation is the insurance-
specific risk. It stands for the fatal risk of an insurance company, that payments 
to be made due to the occurrence of insured events exceed the sum of the pre-
mium income and the capital reserves of the companies.15 The insurance-speci-
fic risk comprises two elements, the risk that, by pure chance, the number of in-
sured events is higher than the expected number, and the risk that the calcula-
tions of the probability of expected events by the insurance company are 
wrong.16 As for product innovations, the insurance companies, in general, only 
have limited experience in the specific estimations. Therefore the insurance-
specific risk is especially high for innovative product offerings.17 
 
                                                 
13  "The vector of service characteristics ... is linked to possible functional imitation by all actual 
or potential competitors (including clients). The service characteristics are indeed highly 
visible and 'volatile', which makes them easy to imitate. The most convincing examples are 
to be found in financial and personal insurance services. The specifications of an insurance 
policy or of a financial product are in the public domain. They are object of firms' marketing 
and advertising policies (advertising leaflets etc.).” (Gallouij, 2002, p. 128). 
14  Kubli (1988, p. 87) assumes, that it takes approximately 6 months for a competitor to copy 
an innovative insurance product. According to Vielreicher (1995, p. 26) it can take more 
than 5 years for an imitator to gain the level of customer confidence needed to succeed in a 
new insurance class. 
15  Albrecht (1992). 
16  See also Menhart et al. (2003). 
17  Pearson (1997, S. 242) further differentiates between the technical uncertainty describing 
the uncertainty of the insurance companies regarding the optimal product offering and the 
market uncertainty as a lack of knowledge whether the innovative product will be accepted 
on the market. In either case, the insurance company can reduce the total insurance-speci-
fic risk by diversifying its product portfolio and, hence, spreading the risk over more fields of 
insurance. 
 4 Industry life cycles in the insurance market 
Biological lifecycles describe the development processes of an individual from 
birth to death.18 Economic life cycle concepts assume, that in analogy to biolo-
gical organisms, economic systems also experience typical phases of develop-
ment in their evolution.19 In the economic literature, life cycle concepts were 
used to explain the development patterns of single products, organizations20, 
technologies21 and whole industries. In the standard model of the life cycle 
concept, specific characteristics of the unit of analysis such as sales volume, 
turnover or number of competitors first increase to a maximum, then decrease 
significantly and finally reach a level of stability, or they are discontinued com-
pletely. 
In the industry life cycle concept, the unit of analysis is either the sales volume 
of an industry22 or the number of competitors in the market.23 If the development 
of the sales volume is analyzed, the industry life cycle is the sum of the life 
cycles of product generations and single products in the respective industry, as 
is shown in the following figure. 
                                                 
18  See also Menhart et al. (2003). 
19  Cathomen (1996). 
20  Höft (1992). 
21  Perez/Soete (1988). 
22  Höft (1992). 
23  Klepper/Graddy (1990) and Klepper/Simons (1997). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Product life cycles and industry life cycle24 
Similar to the industry life cycle model based on the sales volume of the 
products, the model regarding the development of the number of companies in 
the market also assumes an inverted U-shaped pattern.25 After an increase in 
the number of competitors to a maximum due to high entry rates, the number of 
market exits exceeds the entries.26 Thus, the population density is reduced 
through a shakeout process and finally stabilizes at a lower level.27 While there 
is general consent in the existing literature regarding the general pattern of the 
industry life cycle, its interpretations, especially regarding the massive market 
shakeout after the maximum differ significantly.28 In general, the different con-
cepts assume, that there is a shift in the innovative activities from product inno-
vations in the beginning of the life cycle to process innovations in the latter pha-
ses, which forces companies not capable to adapt the innovations to leave the 
market.29  
However, the existing studies analyzing industry life cycles exclusively focus on 
the consumer goods or the manufacturing industry, while the service sector is 
neglected completely. Only on the level of product life cycles, a few attempts 
were made to integrate the specific characteristics of the service industry into 
                                                 
24  Ford/Ryan (1981, p. 120). 
25  Gort/Klepper (1982). 
26  See also Menhart et al. (2003). 
27  Klepper (1997). 
28  Jovanovic/MacDonald (1994), Klepper (1996) or Utterback/Suárez (1993). 
29  Abernathy/Utterback (1978) and Utterback/Abernathy (1975). 
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 the life cycle concepts30 The reason for the strong bias of life cycle studies to-
wards the manufacturing industry may lie in the fact that products in these 
sectors show relatively high death and innovation rates, so that product life 
cycles can be identified easily. In contrast to most goods in the manufacturing 
sector, the motivation for the purchase of an insurance product is based on the 
long-term need for precautions against essential risks in one's livelihood. Farny/ 
Kirsch (1987) therefore claim basic insurance classes such as life or fire insu-
rance to be "immortal products".  
Another difficulty in modeling the product life cycle in the insurance industry is 
caused by the specific characteristics of the demand for insurance products.31 
Their life cycles overlap with external factors such as the density of the popula-
tion, the number of potential risks to be insured or the insurance specific legis-
lation. Besides, as the customer buys many insurance products in bundles, it is 
hard to identify single product life cycles. Considering this reasoning, Vielreicher 
(1993) assumes that the product life cycle of an insurance product shows an 
atypical pattern, as can be seen in the following figure: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Life cycle of an insurance product 
In the first three phases, the insurance life cycle is similar to the standard mo-
del. After the product introduction, the sales volume increases to a maximum. In 
the maturation and degeneration phase of the life cycle however, the shape 
cannot be determined ex ante. The sales volume may decline as in the stan-
                                                 
30  Barras (1986a) or Barras (1986b). 
31  See also Menhart et al. (2003). 
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 dard model, it may as well show further increases or remain stable. The rea-
sons for this atypical pattern lie in the specific characteristics of the demand for 
insurance products. Firstly, an insurance product life cycle basically consists of 
two life cycles, one for the new insurance contracts sold and one for the pre-
mium income generated by the existing contracts. Thus, an insurance product 
can still generate volume, although the insurance companies may not even offer 
it anymore. On top of that, the "immortality" of certain insurance lines such as 
life or fire insurance prevents the product to finally die out after the maturation 
phase.32 Innovative insurance classes mainly supplement the existing products, 
but they do not substitute them.33 
As it is not possible to clearly determine the shape of a single life cycle of an 
insurance product in the maturation and degeneration phase, the pattern of an 
industry life cycle consisting of the sum of all individual product life cycles can-
not be determined either. However, a possible explanation of its development 
can be derived from the specific income elasticity of the demand for insurance 
products on an aggregate level. In the existing literature, there have been only 
limited, but controversial discussions regarding the income elasticity of the 
demand for insurances. Koeniger (2001) claims in his analysis of the UK car 
industry that higher income leads to lower demand for car insurances, as high-
income households can afford to pay for potential repair costs more easily. 
Eisenhauer/Halek (1999) as well as Banerjee/Newman (1991) identify a positive 
relationship between the income level of a household and its risk aversion. 
Geiger (1992) analyzes the demand for personal liability, accident, legal costs, 
and household insurances in Germany. Following his results, there is a positive 
effect of household income on the insurance density in the population.34  
A different approach to the demand for insurance products is based on 
Maslow's theory of human motivation, according to which there is a hierarchy of 
needs observable in the goods consumed by the people.35 
It is quite obvious that the demand for basic insurance products is assumed to 
be part of the second level of Maslow's hierarchy, the need for safety. The his-
                                                 
32  In the history of the German insurance market, only a few exotic insurance lines such as the 
"rain insurance" or the "riot insurance" died out in the evolution of the industry. See Bor-
scheid (1990). 
33  See also Menhart et al. (2003). 
34  See also Menhart et al. (2003). 
35  Maslow (1977). 
 tory of the German insurance sector yields several examples supporting this 
hypothesis. In the early years of the insurance industry, in the middle of the 19th 
century, the purchase of insurance was a privilege of the upper class. However, 
once the industrialization raised the living standard of major parts of the popu-
lation, insurances became popular for lower classes as well. On the other hand, 
immediately after the Second World War, the priority of the population was to 
satisfy the basic physiological needs. Only after the economy recovered and the 
basic needs were fulfilled in the beginning of the fifties, the insurance industry 
experienced a significant upturn.36   
While the physiological needs of the population can be regarded as being more 
or less satisfied after the 1950s, this is not necessarily the case for the need for 
safety. In the last 50 years, almost all classes of insurance in Germany expe-
rienced significant growth rates. On the other hand, Geiger (1992) identified that 
even at the beginning of the nineties 40% of the private households in West 
Germany did not have a life insurance and 70% in the Eastern parts did not 
have an accident insurance.37  
Moreover, the concept of the Maslow's pyramid of needs also helps to explain 
the further growth of the insurance population after the economic upturn in the 
fifties and sixties. Once the second level of needs is satisfied, people seek for 
new goals such as the need for esteem and self-actualization.38 If the people 
nevertheless do not want to neglect the safety requirements of the second level 
of needs, they might demand additional insurance coverage. Hence, the life 
cycles of goods satisfying the higher level of needs should also affect the life 
cycles of the respective insurance products.39 
The development of new needs in the population along Maslow's hierarchy 
does not only induce further growth in the existing insurance classes, it also 
leads to the generation of innovative insurance products. Classes such as the 
insurance of journeys, of domestic animals, of art or musical instruments do not 
                                                 
36  Borscheid (1990) or Surminsky (2000). 
37  See also Menhart et al. (2003). 
38  Maslow (1977, p. 85ff). 
39  A car insurance company will for example profit from an increase in national income, if this 
leads to a higher number of families having two cars. Thus, the life cycles of consumer 
goods of higher levels in the hierarchy are connected to the life cycles of the respective in-
surance products. 
 satisfy the need for safety regarding essential risks in one's livelihood. They 
give additional protection in the fulfillment of higher levels of Maslow's hierarchy. 
All in all, we have two sources for the derivation of an insurance specific Indus-
try life cycle, the pattern of the product life cycle in the insurance industry and 
the specific characteristics of the demand for insurance according to Maslow's 
model.40 Combining those two approaches leads to an industry life cycle, as 
shown in the following figure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Product and industry life cycles in the insurance industry 
Similar to the standard model, the industry life cycle of the insurance sector 
starts with the introduction of the first product innovation. As more and more 
supplementary insurance classes are added, the industry life cycle (measuring 
the total sales volume) increases to a maximum. However, since the shape of 
the life cycle cannot be determined for neither of the individual products, it is 
also impossible to see ex ante, how the aggregated industry life cycle will deve-
lop once a certain maximum is reached. Considering our theses regarding the 
specific characteristics of the demand for insurances in Maslow's model, we 
claim, that in this atypical maturation or degeneration phase, the shape of the 
industry life cycle will be determined by the general economic development.  
 
                                                 
40  See also Menhart et al. (2003). 
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 5 Empirical evidence 
In most of the empirical studies based on the organizational ecology theory, the 
criterion for the definition of an organizational population is the organizational 
output produced.41 Following this approach we will concentrate on casualty & 
property insurance companies.42 We will further neglect the many small local 
insurance companies only active in some regions of Germany.43 The preferable 
empirical way to study the development dynamics of a population is to analyze 
its whole evolution starting at the beginning of the industry. However, due to the 
limited data availability only few studies have actually comprised whole life 
cycles.44  
A complete picture of the evolution of the German insurance industry can only 
be drawn by extending the time period under investigation as far as to the 16th 
century.45 Obviously, it is impossible to gather company specific data covering 
five centuries. Moreover, the development of this sector in the first half of the 
20th century was significantly influenced by fundamental exogenous shocks 
such as the two World Wars and the period of hyperinflation in the 1920s. In the 
comments on the historical development of innovation activities in the German 
insurance market, we have also learned that the vast majority of fundamental 
market innovations were generated between 1850 and 1900, whereas the inno-
vation activities in the time after the World War II were dominated by product 
modifications and internal product innovations. Hence, we will limit our analysis 
to the time after 1950.46 All in all, the database for our empirical tests consists of 
the life histories of 264 casualty & property insurance companies between 1950 
                                                 
41  Barron et al. (1994), Hannan et al. (1995), Messallam (1998) orSwaminathan (1995). 
42  Other classes of insurance such as life and health insurance as well as the complete sector 
of reinsurance companies are excluded of the analysis despite accounting for approximately 
70 percent of the total premium income generated. However, the products offered in those 
four classes are either fundamentally different from each other (a life insurance company 
offering capital investment products can hardly be compared with a company selling pro-
ducts in the area of fire or car insurance) or are significantly influenced by the development 
of public institutions (the evolution dynamics of the private health insurance market funda-
mentally depends on the development of the public health insurance agencies).  
43  Although this will potentially lead to a loss of information as these thousands of small 
companies may interact with the population of the non-local players via processes of diffuse 
competition, this restriction still seems reasonable due to their marginal economic impor-
tance. 
44  Exceptions are represented by the studies of the evolution of the telephone industry from 
the 19th century on in various states in the USA by Barnett (1990) and Barnett/Carroll 
(1987) or the empirical investigations on the population of automobile producers in the USA 
by Klepper (1997) and Klepper/Simons (1997). 
45  See the historical overview of the evolution of the German insurance market. 
46  See also Menhart et al. (2003). 
and 1998 and comprises 8.369 data sets.47 For each of the companies and all 
the years we have information on the year and the kind of founding and 
disbanding, organizational changes, the complete product portfolio of the insu-
rance company and the premium income per year and per class of insurance.48  
The specification of the endogenous variable in the analysis is based on the 
definition of the internal product innovation. An insurance company generates 
an internal product innovation, when it creates a new class of insurance re-
specttively separates an existing insurance area form a class it has already 
offered before. In the data set analyzed, the population members had the pos-
sibility to diversify their product portfolio to the classes of personal liability, car, 
accident, fire, burglary/theft, glass, storm/hailstorm, machine/ technology, 
nuclear sites, aviation, transport, credit/loan, animal, legal cost and other insu-
rances. 
To test for the relationship of economic development and the innovation dyna-
mics we will measure the effect of the growth rates of premium income on the 
number of product innovations. At first sight, the national income would be the 
perfect determinant to test the relevance of our assumptions based on Maslow's 
pyramid of needs. However, the premium income and the national income show 
a correlation of 97,02 =r . Moreover, choosing the premium income as exoge-
nous variable additionally allows to control for capacity constraints in the deve-
lopment of the market (Wiedenmayer, 1992). 
                                                 
47  See also Menhart et al. (2003). 
48  See also Menhart et al. (2003). 
 6 Findings & Conclusion 
Figure 5 shows the development of the population density in the German 
casualty & property insurance market between 1870 and 1998.  
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Figure 5: Population density of German casualty & property insurance companies49 
The number of insurance companies in Germany increased significantly bet-
ween 1870 and the mid-twenties, before it was heavily reduced during a market 
shakeout between 1926 and 1949. From 1950 to the mid-nineties, the popula-
tion showed a continuous density growth. However, we have to take into 
account that the pattern of the population density until the year 1923 in Figure 5 
is only estimated, not based on actual values. To the knowledge of the authors, 
there is no consistent documentation of the population entries and exits for the 
time period before.50 Despite this restriction, we can find several indicators in 
the history of the German service sector and the insurance industry supporting 
the estimated pattern of the population density before 1923.51 The tertiary 
sector globally gained importance in the 2nd half of the 19th century.52 This 
                                                 
49  The figure only shows casualty & property insurance companies active in all parts of 
Germany. Small local population members are not included.  
50  The key source for this analysis, Neumanns "Jahrbuch für das Versicherungswesen im 
Deutschen Reiche" goes back to the year 1903, but only catches parts of the whole classes 
of insurance in the casualty & property business.  
51  However, it is very likely, that the steady increase of the population density shown in Figure 
5 was interrupted during and immediately after the First World War. 
52  Fourastié (1969). 
 phenomenon also holds true for the economic dynamics in Germany between 
1870 and 1925.  
Besides, the industrial revolution generated new objects to be insured and the 
social legislation by Bismarck in the year 1870 supported the distribution of the 
insurance idea in Germany. At the same time, several new classes of insurance 
arose and the idea of a profit-oriented insurance industry was finally established 
and accepted within the economy and the society. Hence, the pattern of the 
population density between 1870 and 1923 as shown in Figure 5 seems plau-
sible.  
In accordance to the standard model of the industry life cycle, a shakeout period 
began immediately after the density maximum was reached in the year 1925 
with 303 insurance companies, which steadily reduced the number of organiza-
tions to 117 in 1948. However, we have to take into account, that this develop-
ment was significantly influenced by fundamental exogenous political and eco-
nomic shocks. The hyperinflation in Germany in the 1920s first caused an in-
crease in founding in the insurance industry, but soon led to a wave of mergers 
and disbanding. Political decisions to centralize the insurance industry by the 
NS-regime, the economic collapse of Germany in the Second World War and 
the loss of the East German areas further intensified the market consolidation. 
Nevertheless, we can also find indicators for the evolution of a mature market in 
alignment with the predictions of the industry life cycle. In accordance with 
Abernathy/Utterback (1978) assuming that the first half of the industry life cycle 
is dominated by product innovations while in mature and degenerated markets 
process innovations are more important, in the time between 1870 and 1930 the 
Germany insurance industry generated most of the fundamental product inno-
vations which still play a major role today. In the time after, the insurance 
market was characterized by product modifications and process refinements re-
spectively extensions of the product portfolios. 
Having in mind these considerations and remembering the long history of the 
German insurance industry, it seems valid to claim that the period between 
1950 and 1998 can be seen as a phase of maturation and degeneration in the 
insurance specific industry life cycle. In contrast to the pattern of the standard 
model, the number of market participants after 1950 did not decline, but rose 
continuously until the mid-nineties.  
 As we hypothesized in deriving the insurance specific industry life cycle, we see 
a non-typical development in the maturation and degeneration phase. We claim 
that the development dynamics of the population of insurance companies in the 
maturation and degeneration phase is determined by the growth rate of national 
income. Following the concept of the Maslow's pyramid of needs an increase in 
national income should lead to a higher demand for safety in the society, a 
development of which the insurance sector can profit more than other branches.  
Under the assumption, that right after the Second World War the satisfaction of 
the basic needs of the people dominated their behavior and that only after the 
economic recovery in the fifties parts of the people managed to climb form the 
first to the second level of needs, the concept of Maslow does have some 
explanatory power regarding the development dynamics of the population of 
insurance companies. As we can see in Figure 6, the premium income and the 
GDP show a similar pattern between 1950 and 1998. However, the premium 
income grew stronger than the GDP. Obviously, the branch of casualty & pro-
perty insurance profited to a high degree from the economic recovery in Ger-
many after the Second World War. At the same time, we know from Figure 5 
that the number of insurance companies between 1950 and 1998 grew almost 
continuously. All these observations support the hypothesis, that in this mature 
market, the economic growth and the development dynamics of the insurance 
population are strongly correlated. 
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Figure 6: Index of premium income and GDP in Germany53 
                                                 
53  Statistisches Bundesamt (2001, p. 654ff.). 
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 Only the years after 1994 show a slight decline in population density (despite an 
increasing GDP). However, we have to take into account, that this period was 
influenced by the European deregulation in the insurance industry in 1994, 
which led to a price war resulting in a high number of mergers and acquisitions, 
which mainly affected the population of small and local companies, but also had 
impact on the density in our population of Germany-wide active organizations.54 
To sum up, the analysis of the density development in the population of the 
casualty & property insurance companies in Germany yielded two major results. 
First, the time period between 1950 and 1998 can be regarded as a non-typical 
maturation and degeneration phase as assumed in the derivation of the 
insurance specific industry life cycle. Second, the development of the population 
density in those years is strongly related to the growth of the national income, 
as forecasted based on the concept of Maslow's pyramid of needs. 
                                                 
54  Between 1994 and 1998 companies merging consisted above others of the "DBV Deutsche 
Beamtenversicherungsgesellschaft", the "Winterthur Lebensversicherung AG" and the 
"Delfin Lebensversicherung AG" (1998), the "Itzehoer Versicherungsverein" with the 
"Schleswig-Holsteinische Brandgilde" (1997) or the "INTERUNFALL Internationale Unfall- 
und Schadenversicherungs-Gesellschaft AG" with the "Erste Allgemeine Versicherungs-AG 
München" (1994). Companies acquired in this period comprised the "Gerling Rechtsschutz 
Versicherungs-AG" (1998), the "Bruderhilfe Rechtsschutzversicherung" (1998), the "Deut-
sche Versicherungs-AG" (1998), the "TELLIT Direct Versicherung AG" (1998), the "Würt-
tembergische Rechtsschutzversicherung AG" (1997), the "Magdeburger Versicherung AG" 
(1996), the "Badenia Glasversicherungsverein a.G." (1995), the "Gebäudeversicherung Ba-
den AG" (1995), the "Elektra Versicherungs-AG" (1994), the "Hamburger Phönix Gaede-
sche Versicherungs-AG" (1994) and the "Skandia Sachversicherung AG" (1994). 
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